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A NEW COVERT CHANNEL OVER CELLULAR NETWORK
VOICE CHANNEL

BUSHRA ALORAINI

ABSTRACT
Smartphone security has become increasingly more significant as smartphones
become a more important part of many individuals’ daily lives. Smartphones undergo all
computer security issues; however, they also introduce a new set of security issues as
various capabilities are added. Smartphone security researchers pay more attention to
security issues inherited from the traditional computer security field than smartphonerelated security issues. The primary network that smartphones are connected to is the
cellular network, but little effort has been directed at investigating the potential security
issues that could threaten this network and its end users.
A new possible threat that could occur in the cellular network is introduced in this
paper. This research proves the ability to use the cellular network voice channel as a covert
channel that can convey covert information as speech, thus breaking the network policies.
The study involves designing and implementing multiple subsystems in order to prove the
theory. First, a software audio modem that is able to convert digital data into audio waves
ii

and inject the audio waves to the GSM voice channel was developed. Moreover, a usermode rootkit was implemented in order to open the voice channels by stealthily answering
the incoming voice call, thus breaking the security mechanisms of the smartphone.
Multiple scenarios also were tested in order to verify the effectiveness of the
proposed covert channel. The first scenario is a covert communication between two parties
that intends to hide their communications by using a network that is unknown to the
adversary and not protected by network security guards. The two parties communicate
through the cellular network voice channel to send and receive text messages. The second
scenario is a side channel that is able to leak data such as SMS or the contact of a hacked
smartphone through the cellular network voice channel. The third scenario is a botnet
system that uses the voice channel as command and control channel (C2). This study
identifies a new potential smartphone covert channel, so the outcome should be setting
countermeasures against this kind of breach.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

This chapter gives an introduction to the research undertaken in this thesis. It
discusses the current problem and motivation for conducting this work, describes the aims
and objectives of the research as well as the work assumptions and limitations, introduces
an overview of the methodologies taken, and, finally, provides the structure of the rest of
the paper.

1.1

Thesis Motivation

Smartphones have become increasingly ubiquitous and have replaced the role of
personal computers because these phones introduce great convenience. In fact,
smartphones have a unique nature as they save more personal data, have “always-on”
network connectivity, and have “location-aware” capability, as well as contain more
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personal data and private information than PCs. As a result, the security of these devices
becomes increasingly important.
Smartphones usually are linked to many communication networks, such as
Bluetooth, near field communication (NFC), and mainly Wi-Fi and cellular networks.
Computer security researchers have shed some light on the PC security issues that have
crept into the smartphone world, which usually are Wi-Fi related; however, little effort has
been directed at studying the potential security breaches of the cellular network. Therefore,
this research discusses how the cellular voice channel can form a covert channel for
legitimate message exchange, information leakage, and malicious code distribution.

1.2

Problem Statement

A study shows that worldwide smartphone numbers exceed the number of PDAs
and PCs combined [1], which makes their threats and risks more serious compared with
other devices. Indeed, smartphone security is a thorny problem, as there are multiple parties
that bear part of the security responsibility, such as smartphone hardware manufacturers,
cellular service providers, smartphone software security companies, smartphone operating
system security mechanisms, poor implementation of cellular communication standards,
and potentially the users themselves!
When GSM, CDMA, and LTE standards were introduced, attacks against cell
phones were not much of a concern; these standards became a dangerous gateway for
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security threats. Also, the fact that there are no security countermeasures, such as firewalls
and IDS to guard the cellular voice traffic in the core of the cellular network, makes these
channels a good choice to launch such an attack.
Yet smartphone software security companies could not provide an effective
solution to protect smartphone security due to the complexity of their communications and
the lack of resources when compared to PCs, such as battery life, processor, and RAM
capabilities. Therefore, solutions inspired by PCs do not fit smartphone security needs well,
especially when addressing the cellular network.
On the other hand, smartphone hardware manufacturers keep their software
implementation as closed secrets; however, they do not use proper security measures. As a
result, multiple security issues have occurred that could exploit these secrets. All the issues
described above contribute to the growth of smartphone security breaches.
Additionally, because cellular voice channel is not designed to convey data but
rather voice, smartphone operating systems do not employ security mechanisms in order
to prevent a potential threat that may come from the cellular voice channel. This kind of
threat has never been attempted previously. What makes the situation even worse is the
lack of security research that addresses the potential cellular network security breaches.
This research introduces one of the potential security breaches that is using cellular
voice channel to carry out a covert communication in order to leak information or spread
malware to smartphones. The potential threat of using cellular voice channel as a covert
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channel is a general threat for all types of smartphone operating systems; however, an
Android operating system was chosen to investigate the issue because of its openness.

1.3

Thesis Objectives

In the smartphone security field, examining the cellular voice channel as a covert
channel has not been studied yet. Therefore, this channel was examined because of its
ability to be a potential medium of information leakage and malware distribution through
carrying modulated “speech-like” data covertly.
The research has four main objectives as follows:
1. Investigating the ability of the cellular voice channel to compose a smartphone
covert channel.
2. Implementing an audio modem to convert digital data to analog waves to be
carried on the cellular voice channel.
3. Building a smartphone rootkit that is able to stealthily open the channel and
exchange data.
4. Examining Android’s operating system security mechanisms against this kind
of threat.
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1.4

Research Methodology

Many subsystems were developed during this research to prove the ability to use
cellular voice channel as a covert channel able to carry modulated data in order to leak data
or distribute malware. First, a modem that was able to convert digital data to a “speechlike” wave to be carried through the cellular voice channel was implemented. In addition,
a user-mode rootkit was developed to answer an incoming voice call covertly from a
specific phone number and to leak information such as SMS or to receive commands
simulating a botnet system. Furthermore, Android security mechanisms were bypassed in
order to develop this kind of system.
The systems were implemented using Android studio development environment
and validated using Galaxy Nexus and Galaxy S 3 Android smartphones. In addition, the
systems are able to run on a rooted official stock Android ROM and a custom Android
ROM. The T-Mobile GSM circuit switched core also was chosen to validate this kind of
covert channel. Further details about system development are mentioned in Chapters 3 and
4.

1.5

Assumptions and Limitations

Several assumptions and limitations are accepted in order to achieve the goals.

1.5.1

The assumptions
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Assumption 1: The developed system could be implemented on any cellular
communication system such as GSM, CDMA, and LTE. However, this research was
validated in only GSM voice channel.
Assumption 2: The audio modem could be implemented to simulate a natural sound such
as a bird tweeting, a piano playing, and a cricket chirping to increase the secrecy of the
covert channel. However, the audio modem was implemented using the traditional
modulation technique named Frequency-shift keying (FSK) modem.

1.5.2

The limitations

Limitation 1: The developed system in this research was only validated with GSM core
network. Other cellular standards have not been tested.
Limitation 2: Because the cellular network voice channel is designed to carry frequencies
that fit into bandwidths between 300Hz and 3400Hz, and the smartphone audio hardware
is designed to play back and capture frequencies that are audible to the average human, the
developed audio modem communications could be heard. However, this modem could be
made to simulate nature voices such as birds or crickets that will increase the covertness
but reduce the channel capacity.
Limitation 3: The current system implementation is hardware specific and depends on
certain smartphone devices. The current implementation is successful on a Galaxy Nexus
and Galaxy S 3, and it works on most Galaxy S models.
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Limitation 4: The system only provides proof of concept and does not take any steps
towards mitigation or suppression.

1.6

Thesis Organization

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides background
information that discusses cellular network infrastructure and traffic flow, cellular voice
channel characteristics, and smartphone architecture. Chapter 2 also explores Android OS
in terms of the Android architecture, Android security, Android Radio Interface Layer
(RIL), and the Android media system. An overview of covert channel and the related
security issues such as rootkit, botnet, and data exfiltration are additionally highlighted.
Also provided is a literature review of works related to smartphone malware, covert
channel phenomenon, and carrying data over the cellular voice channel.
Chapter 3 describes the methodology that was used to conduct the research work.
The chapter also provides the system design and implementation to prove the concept of
using the cellular voice channel as a covert channel. The chapter then provides the tested
scenarios and the development environment. Then Chapter 4 analyzes the system and
verifies the proof of concept. Finally, Chapter 5 provides the research work summary and
recommends areas for further research.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Introduction

Investigating the use of the cellular network voice channel as a covert channel on
Android smartphones requires an understanding of the manifold aspects of the subject. In
this chapter, an overview of these aspects is highlighted. First, an overview of cellular
network infrastructure and its traffic and the cellular voice channel overview are
introduced. Then, the smartphone architecture is provided in order to understand how
smartphones function. Android OS is discussed in terms of Android architecture, Android
security, the Android RIL, and the Android audio system. Covert channel and the rootkit
also are discussed. Finally, a literature review of related work is provided.
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2.2

2.2.1

Background Information

Cellular Network Infrastructure Overview

A cellular network is a radio network distributed over land through base stations. It
usually consists of five components: mobile station (MS), base station (BS), base station
controller (BSC), mobile telephone switching office (MTSO), and public switched
telephone network (PSTN). The MSs represent the mobile phones that communicate to the
BS directly in the same cell. The MS has a subscriber identity module (SIM) that provides
the MS with a unique identity. The base stations connect the mobile switching center
(MTSO) and mobile phones together. The BSC handles the handoff operation between the
BSs as a subscriber moves among the cells. In addition, a cluster of BSCs are connected to
a MTSO, which is the control center for the cellular system. See Figure 2.1.
The MTSO—also known as mobile switching center (MSC)—provides overall
control of the cellular system and acts as a central office exchange to interconnect calls and
connect into the PSTN. MTSO allows subscribers to place calls, and it controls them as
required. Moreover, it holds databases that store the last known locations of the cellphones.
It also contains authentication center and billing information facilities. PSTN is the landbased section of the network that aggregates all the circuit-switched telephone networks in
the entire world to provide infrastructure and services for public telecommunication [2].
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Figure 2. 1:

Cellular Network Infrastructure

A main function of the MTSO is to constantly monitor the quality of the
communications signal. In addition, MTSO usually employs Lawful Interception Systems
(LIS) on all voice and data traffic (such as PSTN, GSM, GPRS, 3G, UMTS, LTE, CDMA,
and VoIP). Regarding data traffic, this kind of system is usually utilized for infrastructure
protection and cybersecurity defense purposes. In the case of voice traffic, it has been used
in real time interception and listening to conversations as needed, as well as for data
retention purposes [3]. However, the primary aim of voice traffic data retention is for
governmental security purposes, such as tracking or identifying the locations of
individuals. Since it is unusual to have audio waves that carry malicious contents, there is
no feature of these systems that analyzes the content of the audio waves to detect the
malicious acts that could threaten the security of the core network or the end users.

2.2.2

Cellular Voice Channel Overview

Understanding how cellular voice channels function is essential to design an audio
modem capable of generating audio waves that can travel among these channels. In digital
cellular systems like GSM and CDMA, when someone makes a phone call, and once the
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voice has passed to the microphone, it would pass the analog-to-digital converter (ADC)
that converts the analog wave into digital data using Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) to be
understood by the cell phone. The PCM method is utilized to represent sampled analog
signals in digital form by recording a binary representation of the magnitude of the audio
sample, after which the sample is encoded as an integer. The data stream then is processed
and transmitted through the cellular core network in digital form.
Audio data stream travels among the cellular channels and is compressed to allow
greater channel capacity. The compression rate relies on the type of voice coded. The
cellular channels are band-limited channels, so audio signals should have frequencies
within the telephone voice band, which is between 300 and 3400 Hz. When the data stream
is received on the other side, it is reset to the original source signal. Then the digital –toanalog (DAC) module converts the bit stream to audio wave again.
In order to reduce the bandwidth of the voice call and save the power of the
cellphone, Discontinuous Transmission (DTX) is used to allow the transmitter of the
cellphone to be turned off when the user is not talking. To do so and to detect silence, DTX
uses Voice Activity Detection (VAD), which is a unit that determines whether the speech
frame includes speech or a speech pause to reduce the transmission to only speech and to
reject noise and silence. Once the frame has been labeled as non-speech, it is dismissed
instead of being transmitted [2] [4].
Currently, voice calls are carried out by using the 2G technology that includes GSM
and CDMA. The 2G is a digital cellular that has a circuit-switched telephone networks
core. However, in the future voice calls will be carried out using packet-switched core
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network. In both networks, cellular voice channels are not meant to carry any other kind of
data but audio waves, and these audio waves usually are not utilized to carry a malicious
content.

2.2.3

Smartphone Architecture

Cellphones are classified into two kinds: feature phones that provide basic
functionalities, like voice calls and sending and receiving SMS, and smartphones that
provide a variety of features in addition to the main cellular phone functionalities, such as
installing applications, browsing the Web, and sending and receiving email. Feature phones
usually have a single processor that has one operating system that handles the baseband
software stack, the user interface, and the applications.
On the other hand, smartphones include at least two processors, the baseband
processor (BP) and the application processor (AP). BP handles radio access to the cellular
network and provides communication protocols such as GSM, GPRS, and UMTS. In
addition, it has a Real-Time Operating System (RTOS) such as Nucleus and ThreadX. AP
is responsible for the user interface and applications. Some smartphones employ an sharedmemory architecture between the baseband processor and the application processor.
However, the modern design has better separation, so the BP and the AP have separate
memories and communicate through a dedicated channel [5][6]. See Figure 2.2, adapted
from [5].
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Figure 2.2:

Smartphone Design Architectures

In smartphones, the cellular voice call routing and control is achieved typically by
the baseband processor only, while the application processor handles all the multimedia
functions. However, as users spend more time using mobile phones for more media-rich
applications, most smartphone hardware designers wanted to provide higher-quality audio
and video performance and longer battery life [7]. See Figure 2.3, adapted from [7] [8].
Therefore, they introduced a separate dedicated processor for audio/video decoding to meet
these increasing needs.
Currently in most smartphones, as has been discovered in this research, the audio
routing functionalities, including voice call functionality, have been moved to be controlled
by the application processor. This feature contributes to introducing a new security issue
as the audio path to the cellular voice channel could be reached from the application
processor.
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a)

b)

Cirrus Logic audio architecture

Wolfson audio architecture

.
Figure 2.3:

2.2.4

Smartphone Audio Subsystem Architecture

Android OS Overview

Android is an open source operating system developed by the Open Handset
Alliance based on the Linux kernel. Android operating system consists of five software
components within four main layers: Linux kernel, libraries and Android runtime,
application framework, and applications. See Figure 2.4, adapted from [9]. The first layer
is the Linux kernel layer that provides main system functionalities such as memory
management and process management. In addition, the kernel takes care of networking and
many device drivers as it communicates with hardware and baseband processor.
The second layer includes two components: a set of libraries and Android Runtime.
The libraries are written in C/C++ and are responsible for providing multiple system
services, such as storing and sharing data of applications, such as playing and recording
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audio and video, and Internet security. The second component in the second layer, Android
Runtime, has a set of core Java libraries that help Android application developers use
standard Java programming language to write Android applications.
Android Runtime also has a main component called Dalvik Virtual Machine
(DVM). DVM is an enhanced version of Java Virtual Machine, which is designed and
developed for Android in order to utilize Linux core features, such as multi-threading and
memory management. DVM allows every Android application to run in its own process
under a unique UNIX UID. DVM is responsible for executing binaries of all applications
located in the application layer.
The third layer is the application framework that delivers many services by offering
Application Programming Interfaces (API) to third party application developers. API
allows the developers to access the different hardware, sensors, and other components of
the devices. The fourth layer is the applications layer, which is written fully in Java and
represents the user application that could be installed, such as games, and social
networking. Applications are written in Java and compiled to the Dalvik Executable (DEX)
byte-code format. Every application executes within its own instance of DVM interpreter.
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Figure 2.4:

Android Architecture Layer

Android applications typically have four types of components: Activities, Services,
Broadcast Receivers, and Content Providers. Table I shows the summary of the Android
applications components. Android applications communicate together using intercomponent communication (ICC) by sending an Intent. Intents are special messages that
instruct applications to perform a specific task. In addition, applications could
communicate using channels controlled by the Linux kernel, such as UNIX domain and
Internet sockets or files.
TABLE I: ANDROID APPLICATION COMPONENT
Android application component

Description

Activity

represents the application’s user interface

Service

works as background processes

Broadcast Receiver

responds to broadcast messages that come from
other applications or from the system

Content Provider

is a database container
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2.1.4.1

Android Security

Android framework involves multiple security mechanisms, such as application
sandboxing, application signing, and Android permission framework. The application
sandboxing mechanism is employed to isolate an application from system resources, actual
hardware, and other application resources. Sandboxing is performed by assigning a unique
user ID to each application to ensure that it has its own sandboxed execution environment.
Application signing is a key security mechanism in Android. All Android applications
should be signed independently with a self-created key using public key infrastructure.
Moreover, all applications that are signed with the same key could share the same UID and
play in the same sandbox.
The Android permission framework is utilized to control access to sensitive system
resources by applying Mandatory Access Control (MAC) on Inter Component
Communication (ICC). Therefore, each application can deﬁne a list of permissions that are
needed for access to components to specify its protection domain and permission approved
during the installation process. In addition, each component could be assigned an access
permission label to specify an access policy that protects the application resources.

2.2.4.2

Android Telephony Framework

The Android telephony stack is responsible for communication between the
baseband modem and the application layer. The Android telephony stack consists of four
main layers: applications, framework services, radio interface layer, and baseband modem.
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The application layer involves all the smartphone telephony applications, such as Dialer,
SMS, and Antenna signal indicator. The phone application in the application layer
communicates directly with the internal API in the telephony framework to place and tear
down phone calls. See Figure 2.5, adapted from [10]:

Figure 2.5:

Android Telephony Architecture

Android telephony framework services is a layer that provides APIs for the phone
application to make calls, and send SMS and MMS. However, APIs cannot be entered from
any other applications that are not part of the Android system. Only the phone default
application can utilize this internal API. The telephony requests are passed to the baseband
modem. The modem replies to the application through the telephony framework.
Communication between the telephony framework and modem are handled by
a RIL. The RIL communicates with the cellular modem by utilizing a single serial line. The
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RIL has two main components: a RIL Daemon and a Vendor RIL. The RIL Daemon
connects the telephony framework to the Vendor RIL and initiates the modem and reads
the system property to find the proper library for the Vendor RIL.
The Vendor RIL is the baseband modem driver. Mobile vendors are various, and,
therefore, each vendor has a different implementation of the vendor RIL. The baseband
modem is a cellular telephony processor that comes in different models, and there are no
standards for this kind of processor. Usually, the implementation of the baseband modem
software is kept secret.

2.2.4.3

Android Media Framework

Since it is important to understand how a smartphone cellular voice call takes place,
it is essential to realize how Android handles audio stream, which forms an important part
in carrying out a cellular voice call. Android Application Framework takes care of
Android’s multimedia system. It uses the Android.media APIs to call media native code
libraries in order to contact the audio hardware. See Figure 2.6, adapted from [11]. The
Android audio libraries include two native layers that deal with audio software: Audio
Flinger and Audio Hardware Interface (HAL).
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Figure 2.6:

Android Audio System

Audio Flinger communicates with the HAL layer, which represents the hardware
abstraction layer that hides audio drivers from the Android platform. Audio Flinger is the
audio server that provides some required audio functions, such as audio stream routing and
mixing, since the audio stream can be input or output to/from multiple microphones,
speakers, and applications. Audio Flinger performs audio routing by setting a routing
mode,

such

as

MODE_IN_CALL,

MODE_IN_COMMUNICATION,

or

MODE_NORMAL, which is then passed into audio.h interface in Audio HAL which, in
turns, determines the routing path.
The audio HAL is vendor-specific and comprises three interfaces: audio.h,
audio_policy.h, and audio_effect.h. Audio.h includes the main functions of an audio
device. Audio_policy.h contains the audio policy manager that represents audio control
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policies. Audio_effect.h encompasses audio effects functions like echo or noise
suppression. The kernel driver contains the audio driver that communicates with the audio
hardware and the HAL.
When some applications use the Audio Flinger to redirect the audio stream as
STREAM_VOICE_CALL, some vendor-specific audio HAL implementations redirect the
stream that comes from/to an application from/to the actual stream voice call by default in
some smartphones. In the other smartphones, redirecting voice call stream from/to an
application from/to the actual cellular voice stream is possible also, because the audio
routing is currently accomplished using the application processor, not the baseband
processor as mentioned earlier. This is achieved by making some modifications to audio
HAL and some application framework components, such as Audio Service and Audio
System, in smartphones that cannot redirect the required audio path by default.

2.2.4.4

Android Phone Calls

In Android, phone calls are achieved using both the telephony and media
frameworks. When the user places a call, the phone application in the application layer
sends a request to the Vendor RIL for a phone call with the phone number. The Vendor
RIL sends the request to the baseband processor. The baseband sends a request to the base
station. When a connection is established, the RIL updates the phone application interface
with the ongoing call, and the phone’s media system stream switches the phone audio mode
to MODE_IN_CALL.
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2.2.5

Covert Channel Overview

The covert channel concept was first presented by Lampson in 1973 as a
communication channel that was neither designed nor intended to carry information at all
[12]. A covert channel utilizes mechanisms that are not intended for communication
purposes, thereby violating the network’s security policy [13]. In fact, the use of a covert
channel means that there is acollusion between the sender and receiver to pass information.
A side channel is a type of covert channel, but only the receiver desires a successful
communication and the information is leaked unintentionally, which could be conducted
through network attacks in this channel.
Three key conditions were introduced that assist in the emergence of a covert
channel: 1) the presence of a global shared resource between the sender and receiver; 2)
the ability to alter the shared resource; and 3) a way to accomplish synchronization between
the sender and receiver [14]. The cellular voice channel has all three conditions, making it
an ideal channel for implementing a covert channel.
Usually the term “covert channel” refers to the hiding of information inside a
carrier, which in this case represents the cellular voice channel. The information conveyed
across this channel is referred to as covert information, which represents the audio signals
that are generated by the audio modem.
There are several security research recommendations that count covert channels as
a source of threats, which requires identifying the channels, assessing their capacity, and,
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depending on that, closing or minimizing the information leak. Therefore, studying cellular
voice channels as a potential source of such an attack was conducted in this research.

2.2.5.1

Covert Channel Taxonomy

Covert channels are usually classified based on the following criteria [15] [16]:


Storage and timing channels
Usually covert channels are categorized as storage or timing channels. Storage

channels involve a storage location written to by the sender and read by the receiver.
Timing channels involve signaling information through a network by manipulating time
values of resources so that the receiver can notice it and interpret the information.


Passive and active channels
Passive channels use an existing connection that is already established to transfer

covert information. It does not initiate any new network connections, so it is usually not
detectable, but it has limited throughput. On the other hand, active channels initiate a new
connection to transfer covert information. It can provide significantly higher throughput as
compared to passive channels, but they are more prone to detection.


Noisy and noise-free channel
A noisy channel can intentionally or unintentionally corrupt the data signal with

errors and so affect the transmitted covert data rate. However, a noise-free channel has no
errors that transmit covert data as is.
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2.2.5.2

Covert Channel Evaluation Criteria

The effectiveness of a covert channel can be evaluated by the following criteria:


Bandwidth



Robustness



Covertness
Channel bandwidth refers to the channel maximum error-free transmission rate.

Bandwidth is usually expressed in bits per second. Robustness determines the ease of
limiting the channel capacity by adding noise or the ease of removing the covert channel.
Covertness determines to what extent the covert channel can be detected; in other words,
it means the secrecy or stealth of the channel. Covertness of a channel is usually determined
by comparing the traffic characteristics with a covert channel and real legitimate traffic.
However, all of these factors cannot be combined together in one covert channel, as they
are conflicted. For example, sending less data increases secrecy; however, it reduces
capacity [17].

2.2.5.3

Covert Channel Applications

Several groups have an interest in keeping their communication stealthy. Using the
traditional security techniques such as encryption and steganography do not help against
the detection of the communication that is taking place. Therefore, a covert channel, a new
trend in using a communication channel that is not anticipated by adversaries, is used. A
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covert channel has many uses, such as providing a transfer channel for viruses, worms, or
other types of malware. Another use of a covert or a side channel is data exfiltration, which
is becoming a serious security issue.
In addition, a covert channel could be utilized to stealthily distribute commands for
the purpose of launching botnets to avoid detection in traditional C2 channels. A botnet is
a group of compromised machines (zombies) infected by a malicious bot to allow a botmaster to remotely control the devices. Botnets could pose a serious threat, such as leaking
information, as well as disseminating malicious code, conducting distributed denial of
service attacks, and performing identity theft. Moreover, usually covert channels are used
in combination with a rootkit [17].

2.2.6

Rootkit overview

The “rootkit” term originally meant a software component developed by attackers
to hide the presence of malware on a compromised operating system. The term was first
introduced as a set of modified tools of system binaries used to gain and keep
administrative privilege access on UNIX systems [18]. Rootkit also could be utilized to
hide processes, alter programs, hide communication channels, etc., while remaining
undetected. In addition, rootkit could be used with botnets to allow a hacker to gain access
and get personal information without being noticed.
There are several rootkit categorizations depending on whether it survives system
reboot or whether it runs in user mode or kernel mode. User mode rootkits are running in
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the application space and intercepting API calls, so when an application makes a system
call, the rootkit can change the values or the flow of those system calls. However, kernel
mode rootkits usually change some kernel data structures after accessing kernel memory.
A memory-based rootkit cannot activate each time the system starts, while the persistent
rootkits can.

2.3

Literature Review

Compared to the PC security research field, the concern for smartphone security
breaches is new. It began with the first mobile malware, named Cabir, which appeared in
2004. Since then, many smartphone malware have appeared, although with simple
functionalities, until the emergence of the first mobile botnet SymbOS.Yxes [19] in 2009,
which targets Symbian platform. In the same year, Ikee. B [20] appeared, and it targeted
jail-broken iPhones that could leak sensitive information and distribute malicious code
through a Bluetooth channel.
PlaceRaider [21] is a proof-of-concept visual smartphone surveillance that has been
proposed. It allows attackers to remotely explore the victim’s virtual environment through
using the smartphone’s sensors, such as camera and microphone, and sending the data
through the Internet. In March 2011, malware named DroidDream [22], which aims to
steal sensitive information and download malicious codes, had been detected embedded
within at least 50 applications in the Android market.
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As smartphones are mostly connected to the cellular network more than Wi-Fi,
some security breaches that are initiated from the cellular network have been launched. For
example, a mobile botnet named ZITMO targeting Symbian, BlackBerry, and Android
platforms has been released into the wild. It aims to leak personal information and forward
it through SMS messages to a predefined bot-master number. In addition, it monitors SMS
communication and leaks mTAN passwords that are sent by banks to validate mobile
transactions [23] [24].
However, all of these security breaches are conducted through an overt channel. An
overt channel transfers information through a legitimate channel used as a medium for data
transmission. On the other hand, a covert channel uses a medium that is not normally used
as a data container to transfer information [14]. The covert channel has appeared in
smartphone areas; for instance, Soundcomber is a proof-of-concept malware [25] that uses
the smartphone microphone sensor and phone call through covert channels in between
applications to get a small amount of sensitive information such as credit card numbers.
Then the private data is transferred through an overt or covert channel using applications
collusion attacks. Moreover, the paper [26] discussed several possible covert channels on
Android OS that use different system states, such as volume or vibration settings, and file
locks as data storage.
The current research field of implementing covert channels focuses on exploiting
the weaknesses in common Internet protocols to embed a covert channel, such as TCP/IP
[27], HTTP [28], VoIP [29], and SSH [30]. In the cellular network field, it has been proven
that the ability to embed high-capacity covert channels in SMS, by composing the SMS in
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Protocol Description Unit (PDU) mode, could be used as a data exfiltration channel [31].
In [32] the authors introduced stenographic algorithms to hide data in the context of MMS
to be used in on-time password and key communication.
An application that modulates data to be “speech-like” is already in existence, such
as a point-of-sale (POS) system. This application uses the cellular voice channel to transmit
an audio-modulated data between the transaction center and POS terminal. Several
previous efforts on transmission data over a GSM voice channel [33-36] have been already
presented. In addition, advanced studies have introduced transferring encrypted data using
GSM voice channel [37-39]. In [40], the authors proposed hiding secret data on compressed
speech bit streams. However, all of these efforts in sending data over the GSM network
voice channel were achieved by computer and GSM modem only, not with smartphones.
Although several security solutions have been developed in order to prohibit
unauthorized data leakage, such as TaintDroid [41] and XManDroid [42] in Android
platform, the proposed solutions are not applicable to cellular network communication.
TaintDroid was developed to track the ﬂow of sensitive information through third-party
applications. XmanDroid monitors multiple channels in between applications and stops
communication that may lead to a privilege escalation attack.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY

3.1

Introduction

To prove the concept of using the cellular network voice channel as a covert channel,
two subsystems were developed during this research: an audio modem that converts data
from digital to analog to carry covert information and an Android user-mode rootkit able
to open the channel covertly for data exchange. In addition, three scenarios were
implemented to show the ability of the combined subsystems to form covert channels, side
channels, and botnets. Therefore, in the following section the audio modem design and
implementation are illustrated, the constraints and the challenges in designing such a
modem are introduced, user-mode rootkit design and implementation are described, and
multiple scenarios utilizing these subsystems together are explained.

29

3.2

Architecture and Implementation

3.2.1 Audio Modem Design

The first developed subsystem was a modem able to carry data through the cellular
voice channel during a normal voice call. The modem consisted of an encoder and decoder
pair that was designed to work entirely in software. The encoder converted raw data into
“speech-like” waveforms to be injected into the microphone of the downlink voice stream.
The audio signals then traveled among the cellular voice channel as speech in digital form,
reached the second cellphone to be played over an uplink voice stream’s speaker, and then
demodulated and converted back into the original data. The designed modem utilized
Morse code combined with Frequency Shift-Keying modulation. Figure 3.1 illustrates the
audio modem design.

Figure 3.1

Audio Modem Design
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3.2.1.1 The Encoder

The encoder encodes text information into Morse code as a series of dots and
dashes. Then it generates pure sine waves of tow frequencies using FSK modulation: one
frequency represents a dot and a different frequency represents a dash using the following
equation for each sample in the buffer:
𝑓(𝑥) = 𝐴𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 ∗ 𝑠𝑖𝑛(2𝜋𝑓) ∗ ( 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒 / 𝑠𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡)

(3.1)

Where:


Amplitude: the amplitude of the wave; it is a constant value for all waves.



f: the frequency of the wave; this is a variable and depends on if the current code is
a dot or a dash.



Sample: the current sample in the buffer.



SampleRate: the modem sampling rate, which is 8000 KHz.



Sample / sampleRate: represents the current time.

The audio modem works as following:
1. Maps each character to its corresponding Morse code.
2. Plays a hail tone to indicate to the beginning of the audio data.
3. For every code:


Plays a tone with high frequency if the code is a dash.



Plays a tone with low frequency if the code is a dot.

4. Plays a silence to separate each character.
5. Plays a long silence to separate each word.
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6. Forms each code to be a “speech-like” waveform of 20 ms frame length to fit into
GSM encoder.

3.2.1.2. The Decoder

The decoder performs the reverse functionality of the encoder. The decoder
performs spectral analysis to analyze each received sample and estimates its frequency to
retrieve the original data. Fast Fourier Transform (FFT) algorithm was used to analyze the
spectrum and detect the frequency pitch. Therefore, when the decoder receives an audio
wave sample, the following steps are accomplished:
1. Low-pass filter is performed to the audio signal to get rid of noise and enhance the
reliability of the pitch detection.
2. Hann window function is applied to the input data to increase the detection quality
by looking into the important details of the signal rather than analyzing the entire
signal and to avoid the signal leakage in both sides of the wave.
3. FFT is performed on the input data, which is an algorithm that quickly computes
the frequency of a given signal. The output of the FFT is an array of N complex
numbers that has both real and imaginary parts.
4. FFT bins are normalized to bring the peak amplitude to a normal level, hence
making the entire received audio signal at the same volume so as to not affect the
quality of frequency detection.
5. Magnitude values of each FFT bin are calculated using the following formula:
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𝑚𝑎𝑔𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒[𝑖] = 𝑠𝑞𝑟𝑡( 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙[𝑖] ∗ 𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑙[𝑖] + 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔[𝑖] ∗ 𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑔 [𝑖])

(3.2)

6. The bin of the maximum magnitude value is obtained in the FFT data.
7. Frequency of the index of the maximum magnitude value to detect the signal
frequency is calculated by this equation:
𝑓𝑟𝑒𝑞 = 𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝑎𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 / 𝑁

(3.3)

Where:


i = index of magnitude



SampleRate = the modem sampling rate



N = size of FFT data

8. Finally, the received frequency is compared to the dot-and-dash frequency values
with a minor tolerance.

3.2.2

Modem Design Constraints and Challenges

To develop a modem that copes with the cellular network channel characteristics,
some constraints on the audio signal were taken into consideration.
1. The generated audio frequencies should fit into bandwidth between 300Hz and
3400Hz, which represents the voice channel bandwidth of the cellular network.
Therefore, generating an ultrasonic signal that can’t be heard by the human ear is
not suitable for this channel.
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2. In addition, the generated audio signals should pass through the voice channel
without being omitted by Voice Activity Detector (VAD), which is primarily used
to stop frame transmission at silence.
3. Cellular networks employ speech compression codecs in order to save the
bandwidth and enhance the quality of sound. As a result these speech compression
techniques could significantly distort audio signals that are not “speech-like,” and
so the generated signal should have the speech characteristics.
Therefore, the audio modem was designed to modulate the audio signal to possess
speech characteristics to reduce distortions that could be produced by VAD and speech
compression, as well as to fit into the cellular voice bandwidth to avoid distortions
produced by filtering. In addition to the constraints mentioned above, there are a number
of challenges in implementing such a modem. In fact, designing an audio modem for the
cellular voice channel communication is difficult, because the cellular voice channel and
the cellphone devices audio hardware have multiple limitations and challenges.
One of the challenges of the cellular voice channel is that the voice call between
two cellphones is achieved in real time; hence, there is no retransmission in case of a
missing voice frame. Sometimes a voice frame could not be received by the other cellphone
because of the noisy air interface, or the voice frame could be dropped intentionally by the
core network when a frame-stealing scenario happens. Frame stealing happens during a
call in some cases, such as when a user receives an incoming waiting call request and the
network drops the current voice frame in the conversation to send a notification to the user.
On the other hand, smartphone capabilities, such as the processor and battery life, as well

34

as the quality of audio hardware, vary among cellphones. For example, a cellphone speaker
that sounds clear and loud could be low or unclear in another, since there are no
standardizations in cellphone speakers and microphone specifications.

3.2.3

Audio Modem Implementation

The audio modem was implemented as an Android application that could be
installed in the application layer. The modem works as follows: When is there an ongoing
cellular voice call, the receiver side should press the receive button to obtain the required
data. At the sender side, a text message is sent to AudioUtils class that, in turn, calls Morse
class in order to encode the text data into Morse code. The EncodeMorse method in Morse
class will take the input data and perform the conversation that generates Morse code then
composes an Integer array that contains the frequencies of dots and dashes. This array then
is sent to the encoder to be sampled as sine waves. See Figure 3.2 below:

Figure 3.2:

Generating Sine Waves by the Encoder

The encoder then creates a byte array to be sent to PlayThread class that contains
an Audio Track to play the audio tones and inject them into the cellular voice stream. See
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Figure 3.3 below:

Figure 3.3:

Injecting Audio into the Voice Call Stream

At the other end, MicrophoneListener constantly records the incoming audio waves
and sends the buffer to StreamDecoder. See Figure 3.4 below:

Figure 3.4:

Recording Voice Stream Call Buffer

StreamDecoder monitors the recorded buffer continuously to look for the hail key,
which refers to the beginning of the real incoming audio data. The hail key has a different
frequency from the dots and dashes and is generated once at the encoder to indicate the
beginning of audio data to be recorded. If the hail key was not found, the detection mode
would run to check the incoming data over again. If the key was found, the StreamDecoder
would send the recorded buffer to the Decoder to decode the audio waves. The decoder
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hires the math package that has an FFT algorithm and other signal processing functions to
process the incoming signals and detect the frequencies. See Figure 3.5 below:

Figure 3.5:

Decoding Audio Signals Using FFT Algorithm

Once the audio signal frequencies have been determined, the decoder creates an
Integer array of the detected frequencies that will be sent to the Morse decoder to retrieve
the original data. Figure 3.6 shows the data flow of the implemented modem.
The frequencies that were chosen with the modem are 600Hz and 1000Hz to satisfy
the demands of the cellular network voice channel bandwidth (300Hz and 3400Hz). In
addition, the sampling rate was selected at 8000 kHz to suit the telephony system sampling
rate that carries speech signals. Each 20 ms a voice frame will be injected into the GSM
encoder to avoid the distortion that could be issued from the VAD.
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Figure 3.6:

3.2.4

Audio Modem Decoder and Encoder Data Flow

Voice Call Rootkit Design

Besides an audio modem that converts digital data to audio waves and sends the
data during a normal call, another system was needed in order to compromise smartphone
operating systems and open the cellular voice channels by stealthily answering voice calls
and performing data exchange. This kind of system was accomplished by utilizing a rootkit
that can hide its presence in the operating system to quietly allow continuous privileged
access.
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3.2.4.1. Bypassing Android Security Mechanisms

Answering a voice call in Android is achieved by a Phone App that resides in the
application layer of Android. A Phone App runs inside com.android.phone process that
comprises multiple telephony components such as SIP, SMS, Simphonebook, and Phone
App. All these components utilize the telephony framework APIs to communicate to the
baseband modem through the RIL socket. Hence, the Phone App communicates to the
baseband modem by calling the framework APIs to initiate and receive voice calls.
To help rootkit catch the incoming calls before being delivered to Phone App, it
was necessary to find a way to make the rootkit able to reach the RIL socket in order to
listen to the baseband modem messages. RIL socket is a Linux socket that is owned by
com.android.phone process only, and it cannot be entered from outside the phone process.
Thus, building rootkit inside the com.android.phone process to communicate to the socket
was a good choice to secretly communicate to the baseband modem and intercept its
messages.
Designing a rootkit that works inside the phone process requires overcoming the
Android application sandboxing mechanism. This is achieved by assigning a unique User
ID for each application so that the other applications cannot access its data and resources
unless they have shared a User ID and process, as well as their certificate match. The rootkit
takes advantages of android:sharedUserId and android:process attributes to play inside the
com.android.phone process sandbox and use its resources to be able to access the RIL
socket.
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The android:sharedUserId attribute allows an application to share the same User ID
with another one; hence it can reach the others’ application data and resources. The
android:process sets the process where all the application components should run. Setting
both attributes, sharedUserId and process, allows both applications to run in the same
process and access each other’s resources. Setting sharedUserId and process attributes on
the manifest allows rootkit to run similar to the com.android.phone process; however, it
also requires that either the rootkit certificate match the Phone App certificate or the
signature verification process in Android bypassed during the installation time.
Phone App is signed by the system platform certificate and runs in the shared
system sandbox as a system user, which has more privileges to access the system resources.
Signing rootkit with the platform signature was possible with some custom ROMs such as
Cyanogenmod, because they are using the default certificate that is known as it is released
publicly.
Another method also was used in this research—bypassing the signature
verification method in order to infect the rooted Android official ROMs. That was achieved
by modifying Services.jar. Services.jar has multiple java classes, and one of them is
PackageManagerService class that is responsible for matching the signature of the
application during installation time. The method in PackageManagerService is called
CompareSignatures, which is a Boolean method that returns true if the signatures match
and false if not. Therefore, the method was modified to always return true, which means
the signature is always matched. See Appendix A for more detail.
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After overcoming security obstacles, rootkit was built successfully inside the phone
process and needs to go further to intercept the telephony framework APIs calls and take
control of answering the incoming voice calls. To find a tactic to intercept the telephony
APIs calls and control the call flow, it was important to understand the intricacies of
telephony applications to realize their weaknesses and vulnerabilities. However, as there is
no documentation about the telephony applications, analyzing the Phone App and internal
telephony framework source code was essential. Therefore, in the following section a
discussion about Android application architecture and the Phone App incoming call data
flow is provided in order to discover any vulnerability that helps in achieving the goal.

3.2.4.2. Android Application Architecture

In this section, an overview of how the Android application generally works is
highlighted. When an Android application is not running, and one of its components just
starts working, the Android system initiates a new Linux process with a single main thread
of execution for the application. Then, when another component of the same application
also starts, it will run in the same process and the same main thread.
The main thread is essential because all the application’s components will run in it
by default. The main thread is responsible for the user interface interactions and events
handling and handles system calls to each application component. Android thread can
associate with a looper, which runs a message loop for a thread to process different
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messages. A looper contains a MessageQueue that contains a list of the messages. The
interaction with the message queue is performed by using a Handler class.
The handler is associated to the looper and its associated thread. Handler is
responsible for handling messages within the MessageQueue. When the message is
delivered to the handler, a new message arrives in the MessageQueue. When a thread
creates a new handler, it bounds the handler to it and to its message queue. Then the handler
works to send messages to the message queue and handles messages as they arrive from
the message queue. See Figure 3.7 below:

Thread
Dispatch

Looper

Handler
Handler 22

Message Queue
M4 M3 M2 M1

Handler
Handler 33
Post

Figure 3.7:

Handler
Handler 11

Handler 4

Thread's Looper and Handler

By exploring the source code of the telephony application and framework, it was
discovered that all the important components inside the com.android.phone process are
running in the same main thread and hence are connected to PhoneFactory’s looper and its
message queue, which is located in the internal telephony framework.
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Therefore, the rootkit was designed to run inside the system sandbox and in the
phone process as a background service. Once rootkit service has been created inside the
phone process, it runs in the phone process main thread, thus hooking itself to the main
thread looper and its message queue. The rootkit creates a handler to process the looper
messages that belong to PhoneFactory so that it can receive/send messages from/to the
PhoneFactory looper.

3.2.4.3. Incoming Call Data Flow

When an incoming call request arrives to the baseband modem, it is delivered to
the Vendor RIL and, in its turn, passes it to the RIL daemon that eventually delivers the
request to the telephony framework layer. The request message is passed among the
telephony framework classes in this order: RIL, Basecommand, GSMCallTracker,
GSMPhone, BasePhone, and then CallManager, which, in its turn, communicates to the
Phone App in the application layer of Android to show an incoming call. See Figure 3.8.
Each class in the telephony framework can obtain notifications about the arriving
messages by using the RegistrantList object, which is simply an object that holds java
ArrayList of Registrants objects. Therefore, each class registers itself with the pre-class list
in order to obtain the notifications. Rootkit takes advantage of this design and registers
itself with the PhoneBase; hence it gets the incoming notifications when they are delivered
to the CallManager and acts before CallManager handler passes the incoming notification
to the Phone App. Once rootkit has received the incoming notification about a new
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incoming call, it obtains the incoming caller ID and compares it with a predefined number.
If the number does not match, it leaves the notification to arrive at its final destination,
which is the Phone App that shows an incoming call. However, if the caller ID matches the
predefined number, it answers the call covertly.

Figure 3.8:

An Incoming Voice Call Request Flow in Android

Android thread can only perform one task at a time, if a long running task has been
executed in the handler, the message queue cannot handle and process any other messages.
In addition, it was discovered during this research if the message queue has been starved
by sending two messages at the front of the message queue, it hinders the looper and block
the thread from delivering the new messages as. Therefore, when rootkit want to answer
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the call covertly, it hinders the looper from delivering the other messages until finishing
the call. Thus the looper in the phone’s main thread will not be able to deliver the other
messages to the phone application.
Rootkit acts as a proxy between the application layer and the telephony framework
to transparently intercept and filter incoming voice calls from the baseband modem.
Whenever an incoming voice call request comes from the baseband modem to the Phone
App, rootkit intercepts that incoming call request and decides whether to answer the call
covertly in the case of calls from a specified number or pass the call request to the phone
app to show the incoming call. See Figure 3.9 below:

Rootkit

Figure 3.9:

Rootkit Location and Control Flow on Android’s Telephony
Stack
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3.2.5. The Rootkit Implementation

Rootkit was implemented as an Android service that should be installed in the
system partition of the application layer because it needs a privileged access. Rootkit works
as follows: rootkit service starts with the system boot and works as a persistent service, so
when it is killed by the system due to a shortage of system resources, it is restarted again.
When the service runs, it works inside the phone process and the phone process main
thread. The service creates a handler and hooks itself and the handler to the main looper of
the main thread in phone process. Once the handler has been created, it becomes able to
obtain and send messages from/to the phone main thread message queue.
When the handler starts, it registers itself with the PhoneBase’s Registrant List to
be able to listen to messages that come from Phone Base object and to receive notifications
before CallManager. When the handler receives a new ringing connection message from
the Phone Base, it gets the caller ID and compares it with a predefined number. If the caller
ID does not match, it leaves the message to arrive at its destination. If it matches, it answers
the call before the Phone App has been notified and hinders the main looper by starving its
message queue. The handler sends two messages in front of the message queue, hence
hindering it.
In fact, while implementing rootkit, it was essential to use the Android telephony
internal classes and hidden components. However, as stated in Android documentation,
these internal and hidden API telephony classes could not be reached by other applications
other than the phone process. This rule was simply achieved by excluding the jar files of
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the internal and hidden APIs from the developer environment, such as Android Studio and
Eclipse environments, and no extra steps were taken in Android to prevent using these
APIs at the run time. So the solution was simply to include these jar files in the developing
environments to be able to use them. See Appendix A for more details.

3.3

Experimental Design

Using a real cellular infrastructure is more reliable than a simulated network;
therefore, a real cellular network infrastructure and real smartphone were used during the
experience to validate the theory. The T-Mobile GSM network was chosen to test the
ability to employ the cellular voice channel as a covert channel that transfers covert
information. The developed systems in this research could be run in all Android phones.
However, in some Android devices there is a need to modify some Android system audio
files in order to control the voice call stream.
The smartphones used in this experiment are Samsung Galaxy S3 and Galaxy
Nexus as shown in Table II and Table III with their technical specifications. These two
phones were chosen because of their ability to control the voice call stream by default; thus
no extra work was needed to modify some system audio files to control the stream. The
voice call was only used for the experiments. Both smartphones run Android Jelly Bean
4.3.3. Galaxy Nexus runs Cyanogenmod custom ROMs, and Samsung Galaxy S3 runs a
rooted official ROM.
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TABLE II: GALAXY NEXUS WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Feature

Description

Device name

Galaxy Nexus

Android OS version

Android 4.3

System chip

Texas Instruments OMAP 4460

System memory

1 GB

CPU

1.2 GHz dual-core ARM Cortex-A9

GSM

850, 900, 1800, 1900 MHz

Additional microphone/s

Yes

TABLE III: SAMSUNG GALAXY SIII WITH TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
Feature

Description

Device name

Samsung Galaxy SIII 19300

Android OS version

Android 4.3

System chip

Samsung Exynos 4

System memory

1 GB

CPU

1.4 GHz quad-core ARM Cortex-A9

GSM

850, 900, 1800, 1900 MHz

Additional microphone/s

Yes

48

3.3.2

Experimental Design Overview

When a channel is used to transfer information against the system design policy, it
is considered a covert channel. In order for a covert channel to be utilized, an individual or
malware must exist to convey the data. Therefore, different scenarios are discussed in order
to show different statuses that could occur with this kind of security threat. These tests
were executed to prove functionality and effectiveness of this proof of concept for using
the cellular network as a covert channel.

3.3.2.1 First Scenario

The first scenario was implemented to investigate the ability to utilize the cellular
network as a bidirectional covert channel. An Android application was developed to allow
two individuals to communicate by manipulating a shared resource, which is the cellular
voice channel, in an unexpected way, thus violating information flow policies. In this
scenario, two individuals exchange text messages using a smartphone application and the
cellular voice channel as a shared resource. The messages are modulated as speech-like
and then travel through the cellular network core. The other smartphone application should
receive the speech-like waves and demodulate them to get the original data. In this scenario,
only the software audio modem was used and combined with a user interface to help the
two individuals to send and receive the messages. The application resides in the application
layer as a regular application that works as a software audio modem. Thus, any kind of
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information could be leaked intentionally from the sender to the receiver. Figure 3.10
shows the covert channel experiment:

Receive
Message

First party

Second party
Modem

Figure 3.10:

Modem

Send
Message

Covert Channel Experiment

3.3.2.2 Second Scenario

The second scenario examines the ability to use the proposed covert channel to leak
information unintentionally from one side, while the other side desires a successful
communication. This kind of communication is known as side channel. In this scenario
rootkit works in the hacked smartphone and monitors and filters the incoming calls. Once
rootkit has received an incoming voice call from a predefined number, it opens the voice
channel covertly before it shows up in the smartphone’s Phone App to allow data exchange.
In this scenario, when the channel is opened, the last SMS in the hacked smartphone
will be modulated and sent over the covert channel to be acquired by the other side. The
other side uses the software audio modem application to modulate the audio waves and see
the last SMS. In addition, theoretically any kind of data could be leaked such as a picture
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or video; however, this implementation focuses on text data and was used only to validate
the proposed covert channel. Figure 3.11 shows the side channel experiment:

Hacker Phone

Hacked Phone

Leak

Receive

Modem

Phone

SMS

SMS
Rootkit
RIL

Figure 3.11:

Side Channel Experiment

3.3.2.3 Third Scenario

The third scenario was implemented to test the proposed covert channel to be
involved in botnets as C2 channel. With any botnet, C2 channel is the most significant part
that contributes into its covertness and effectiveness. The designed system is similar to the
second scenario, as it combines both the audio modem and rootkit. However, when the
rootkit opens the incoming voice channel based on a decision made regarding the caller ID
number, the rootkit listens to any command that is sent by the other side and executes it
directly instead of leaking information from the hacked device. See Figure 3.12. In this
case, rootkit will act as a botnet that listens to commands and executes them as required.
Table IV includes some of the offered commands in this scenario:
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TABLE IV:

SOME COMMANDS WITH THE IMPLEMENTED BOT

Command

Description

Reboot

Reboot the system.

Clrlog

Clear call log.

Blueto

Switch Bluetooth on.

Hacker Phone

Hacked Phone

Execute
Command

Modem

Phone

Open
Bluetooth

Rootkit
RIL

Figure 3.12:

Botnet Experiment

3.3.2.4 Rootkit Situations

Rootkit makes some decisions based on the current satiation of the phone call state
as follows:


When the hacker calls during a hung up call between the victim and another party:
rootkit will automatically reject the hacker’s call without being noticed by the
victim.
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When the hacker calls during as idle phone state, rootkit will answer the call
covertly and allow data exchange.



When the victim tries to initiate an outgoing call during a hung up call, or when the
victim receives an incoming call waiting request during a hung up call by the
hacker, the Phone App will not respond to the request and will be idle, because its
main loop has been strived by a denial of service attack that was accomplished by
rootkit.

3.4

Development Environment

The development system was 64-bit Windows 7 with 8 GB of RAM, Intel core i7,
450 GB of hard drive space. Android Studio Environment was utilized to develop the
systems. The telephony internal classes and hidden components were added to the Android
Studio Environment to enable them in the development environment. In addition, multiple
tools were required for implementing and testing the systems in the Android environment
as follows:


Android Debugger Bridge (adb), which is a command line interface to establish
communication between the developing computer devices and smartphone devices
that are connected by USB cable. This tool is utilized to access a shell terminal in
Android devices for transferring an application.
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Smali/baksmali is a tool that is used as an assembler/disassembler for the dex
format used by DVM. This tool was used to compile and decompile the service.jar
in order to modify it and bypass the signature verification.



Dex2jar is a tool to read the Dalvik Executable (.dex/.odex) format.



7-zip is a tool is used for manipulating archives.



OpenSSL is a tool used in the research to create and manage the private keys and
public keys.

For further details describing how to set up the development environment, see Appendix
A.

3.5

Deployment

Installing the developed software audio modem system was accomplished simply
by installing it in the application partition of Android. However, the rootkit that involves
the audio modem needed to be installed in the system partition, because it needs root
privileges in order to run. The following instructions highlight the important steps that are
followed to deploy the rootkit to the Android smartphone:
1. Launch a terminal.
2. Start the connected device shell terminal.
3. Obtain root access.
4. Mount Android system.
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5. Install rootkit in system app folder, and install the audio modem in data app folder.
6. Unmount Android system.
Appendix A includes more details about the system deployment.

3.6

Summary

This chapter described in detail the architecture and design considerations for
developing an audio modem and rootkit to proof the capability of the cellular voice channel
to convey covert information. The systems were implemented and validated using TMobile GSM cellular network. Samsung Galaxy S3 and Galaxy Nexus smartphone devices
were chosen for the research. The development environment and deploying method also
were explained. In addition, different scenarios that were tested to validate the proof of
concept were illustrated. The test results and system analysis are introduced in the next
chapter.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

4.1

Introduction

This section introduces a discussion about the system design and implementation
analysis and the different tested scenario results that were mentioned in chapter 3. In
addition, it discusses the overall analysis of the covert channel criteria. Screenshots of the
smartphone screen during the experiments are provided. The tests and results discussion
focuses on the capability to achieve a bidirectional communication over the cellular voice
channel and from/to smartphone application layer to prove the theory. However, the
performance is not covered in this discussion.
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4.2

Modem Design and Implementation Analysis

The audio modem design aims to test the capability to generate an audio wave that
could be modulated/demodulated successfully between the smartphones through the
cellular voice channel. Another purpose is to verify the ability to develop a software audio
modem that could be installed in the smartphone application layer and access the voice call
stream to inject audio data.
The modem was tested successfully in Samsung Galaxy S 3 I9300, Galaxy Nexus,
and Nexus S GSM versions. In fact, any smartphone that has the ability to record the voice
call is prone to the botnet scenario, as it can receive any audio wave as a command and
execute it. Samsung Galaxy S 3 was one of these devices. Understanding the vendorspecific audio subsystem mechanisms is important in order to successfully deploy the
modem to the smartphone.
The modem implementation works in most Android smartphones, but the ability to
access the voice call stream varies among the Android smartphones. Some smartphones
can reach the voice stream from Audio Manager directly; however, reaching the voice
stream of the cellular call in the other smartphones could be accomplished by modifying
some Android system files. The current modem implementation with the capability to reach
the voice call stream by default works on most Samsung Galaxy S series and Nexus
smartphones.
The modem modulation technique that was used in this research is not the perfect
one that could be implemented. It was used only to prove the concept as it has some
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drawbacks that affect conveying data. Hence this design could be optimized in order to
achieve better performance. The modem works only in Android platform; however, it can
be also implemented in other platforms. Overall, the implemented modem successfully
proved the ability to employ the cellular voice channel to act as a covert channel, and this
can be achieved using smartphones.

4.3

Rootkit Design and Implementation Analysis

User-mode rootkit design has two primary purposes—building a rootkit that is able
to communicate to the baseband modem and run covertly in any rooted Android OS, and
filtering the incoming call to answer the voice calls, if needed, before they show up on the
Android screen. In addition, it was important to verify the ability to implement a portable
rootkit that can work easily without modifying underlying system files or applications. In
fact, the portability factor is significant to test the ability to deploy the rootkit in any
smartphone device, which indicates the ease of its distribution among smartphones.
Rootkit has not been tested in the new Android version Kit Kat 4.4. Although Kit
Kat added a new feature to the DVM, which is called Android Runtime (ART), this
operating system runs DVM as default and ART is still in its testing phase. The difference
between DVM and ART is that DVM uses the just in time (JIT) method to compile the
Android app, so each time the app runs, DVM compiles part of it to machine code. ART,
on the other hand, compiles the whole app Dalvik bytecode during the installation into
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a system-dependent binary, and it does that one time. However, Kit Kat OS also could be
prone to infection by this rootkit.
Rootkit implementation successfully verified what it was meant to do. Rootkit was
able to be portable and work silently. It runs in only Android platform, because the study
focused on Android platform since its sources are accessible. Rootkit works in all Androidrooted stock ROMs, as well as most custom ROMs that have Jelly Bean 4.3.3 version or
below. Rootkit was tested successfully in Samsung Galaxy S 3 I9300, Galaxy Nexus and
Nexus S, Samsung Galaxy S 4, and Samsung Galaxy Duos y GSM versions, and it is
believed to work in most GSM and CDMA Android smartphones.

4.4

4.4.1

Covert Channel Analyses

Covertness

The channel is difficult to detect because it is not known and predicted by an
adversary. Another factor that contributes to the covertness is that these channels and the
core network do not hire any network security guard, such as Firewalls and IDS to analyze
the network traffic, which could carry a malicious content since the voice channel has never
been used to exchange data between two cellphones.

4.4.2

Capacity
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The channel capacity is related to the covertness. The channel is more covert when
less data is transferred at a time; however, in this channel the voice call throughput was
entirely occupied in order to convey covert information. This kind of channel is considered
an active channel that establishes a new connection to exchange covert information. Active
channels usually offer significantly higher throughput as compared to passive channels but
that could be from ease of detection. In addition, a cellular voice channel fits into the noisy
covert channel classification, as it could intentionally or unintentionally drop the data frame
and so increase the transmitted covert data error rate.
The used GSM speech codecs affect the bit rate of the data. In addition, the speech
codec can be switched during calls, because cellular network providers also can control
and increase the number of active calls within one base station by switching cellphones to
a low bitrate speech codec. That will impact the data transfer rate, as it could vary among
the speech codecs and also in one speech codec at the time when the base station
experiences an overload.

4.4.3

Robustness

The channel robustness determines the ease of limiting the channel capacity by
adding noise or the ease of removing the covert channel. Therefore, the channel robustness
is high, because it is not reliable to remove or add noise to this kind of channel, since it
will affect the legitimate data transferring quality.
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4.5

Scenario Analyses

The audio modem experiment that was performed in different scenarios showed
some variability in results. In tested scenarios, when ideal conditions occurred where the
surrounding environment is quiet, the smartphone hardware is loud and clear, the air
interface is not noisy, and the call is carried out over one speech compression technique.
The results were perfect and accurate, as the second party got the exact sent message.
In a realistic scenario, these conditions are not always guaranteed, so any conditions
can easily either hinder the message from being transformed or omit some frames in the
sent message. However, the audio modem design can be enhanced and optimized to
overcome these constrains. The objective of the audio modem implementation is only to
verify basic functionality and show possible scenarios that can be implemented
successfully on real smartphones.
The goals of rootkit implementation were to prove the ability to build a tool that
answers the voice call secretly without the knowledge of the smartphone’s owner or the
Phone App and to show the ability to leak information or receive commands through the
voice channel. The test results show that rootkit works as it was designed. However, the
only problem is when the rootkit answers the call from the attacker; the phone process
message queue will be blocked, and any new messages cannot be delivered such as a new
incoming call.

4.5.1

First Scenario: Covert Channel
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Test objective
This test aims to show the capability to hire the cellular voice medium for
exchanging data covertly between two cooperating parties and to examine the reachability
of smartphone voice call stream within the application layer of Android.

Test Results
Figure 4.1 displays a screenshot of the smartphones to show test results. During an
active voice call between two individuals, when the receive button in the audio modem
application was clicked on one smartphone, it received the audio signals that had been sent
by the other party over the cellular network. The second smartphone received the audio
signals and demodulated them successfully, and it was able to show the original data that
has been sent from the other smartphone. This successfully validates the modem’s ability
to utilize the cellular voice channel as a carrier of the generated audio signals by the
smartphone. However, the receiver sometimes could not get the exact original data for
several reasons, such as noisy environment, the frame stealing scenario, smartphone audio
hardware quality, and the modem implementation.
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Sender

Receiver

Figure 4.1:

4.5.2

Covert Channel Test Screenshots

Second Scenario: Side Channel

Test Objective
This test examines the ability of the rootkit to open the voice channel secretly on
the hacked smartphone and leak data from a hacked smartphone through the cellular voice
channel located in the hacker smartphone.

Test Results
Figure 4.2 displays a screenshot of the smartphones to show test results. When the
attacker made a call to the victim, rootkit recognized the attacker caller ID and based on
that fact, it answered the call without showing up on the victim’s screen. The victim had
no idea about the ongoing voice call in his smartphone. Rootkit leaked the last received
SMS in the victim’s device by using the software audio modem. The attacker obtained the
SMS by using the developed audio modem. However, the victim might hear audio waves
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played in his/her phone, and this issue can be overcome by using modulation techniques
that simulate a natural sound like a bird or cricket, as these sounds could be played as a
notification in some applications.

Screen during the call

Figure 4.2:

4.5.3

Hacker

Last SMS

Side Channel Test Screenshots

Third Scenario: Botnet

Test objective
This experiment tests the capability to use rootkit to open the voice channel
secretly when the attacker calls. Then the hacked smartphone receives commands through
the cellular voice channel from the attacker’s smartphone to execute them.
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Test Results
Figure 4.3 includes screenshots of the smartphones to show test results. When the
attacker made a call to the victim, rootkit recognized the attacker caller ID and based on
that answered the call without showing up on the victim’s screen. Rootkit then waited to
receive a command, and once it was obtained, it was executed. The attacker sent the
command using the developed audio modem.

The Bluetooth turned on

Figure 4.3:

4.6

Send Command

Botnet Test Screenshots

Summary

The developed systems and scenario results and analyses were provided in detail in
this chapter. The audio modem and rootkit design and implementation analysis were
discussed. In addition, the tested scenarios’ objectives and test results were explained. The
next chapter provides a conclusion of the research and recommendations for future work.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK

5.1 Introduction

This chapter concludes the efforts undertaken in this thesis. It discusses the
significance of the achieved research, provides recommendations for future research, and
summarizes the entire effort.

5.2

Significance of Research

As smartphones are trending to increase their computational capabilities,
employees and individuals increasingly rely on smartphones to perform their tasks, and as
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a result smartphone security becomes more significant than ever before. One of the most
serious threats to information security, whether within organization or individual, is covert
channels, because they could be employed to leak sensitive information, divert the ordinary
use of a system, or coordinate attacks on a system. Therefore, detection of the covert
channel is considered an essential task.
This research takes a step in this direction by detecting a potential covert channel
which could affect smartphone security. It provides a proof of concept of the ability to use
the cellular voice channel as a covert channel to leak information or distribute malware. It
introduces details of designing and implementing the system and the challenges and
constrains that have been faced to accomplish the system. It has been realized during this
research that as smartphone hardware and software designs have changed recently, it
allowed and contributed to the issue discussed in this research, as the new design allows
access to the voice stream path from the application processor.
This research also proves that communication between the application processor
and the baseband processors is vulnerable to attack in Android OS. In addition, it discusses
some of the Android security mechanisms that were easily bypassed to accomplish the
mission. The paper illustrates some discovered flaws in Android application architecture
that allow a break in significant and critical Android operations.
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5.3

Future Recommendations

When the covert channel had been discovered, implementing and testing was
important to verify its effectiveness. Multiple scenarios were provided to give insights into
how to eliminate or hinder its functionality. The research shows that this kind of covert
channel can be practically applied and used. Bandwidth of this channel was sufficient for
bidirectional communication. The covertness and the reliability were also good.
After identifying the covert channel, usually some countermeasures should be
performed that might include eliminating the channel, limiting the bandwidth of the
channel, auditing the channel, and documenting the channel. Obviously, this kind of
channel could not be eliminated and its capacity could not be reduced, because these
choices would affect significantly on the voice call availability and quality. However,
auditing and documenting should be involved at setting the countermeasures in future work.
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APPENDIX A: DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT

This Appendix illustrates the development environment and includes the following
sections:
A.1.

Downloading the Android Environment

A.2.

Adding the internal telephony APIs and hidden components into
Android Environment

A.3.

Obtaining and issuing the certificate

A.4.

Modifying the Android Services.jar

A.1 Downloading the Android Environment
Step-by-step instructions for downloading the Android Studio Environment can be
found at [43]. The following are steps taken from the website to set up the environment in
Windows OS.
1. Download and install JDK 6 or greater.
2. Select Start menu > Computer > System Properties > Advanced System
Properties. Then open Advanced tab > Environment Variables and add a new
system.
3. Set an environment variable JAVA_HOME to indicate the JDK folder.
4. Download the Android Studio package.
5. Install Android Studio and the SDK tools.
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6. Launch the downloaded EXE file, android-studio-bundle-<version>.exe.
7. Follow the setup wizard to install Android Studio.

A.2. Adding the internal telephony APIs and hidden components into Android
Environment
During the development of an Android project using Android Studio Environment,
the environment uses Android classes that reside in a jar file called android.jar. The
android.jar could be found in Android SDK platform directory SDK /platforms/platformX/android.jar, where X is the API level number. The Android internal classes and hidden
components have been eliminated from the android.jar file. When launching the developed
application on a real smartphone, the smartphone loads framework.jar from the smartphone
/system/framework/ framework.jar that has the same classes in android.jar and all
the internal API classes and hidden API functions.
This section has instructions to add internal and hidden APIs to Android Studio
Environment that are helpful during developing time [44]:
1. Select Android platform X as a target. In this research, API Level 18 platform has
been utilized.
2. Plug the device or the emulator to pull the jar files: framework.jar, framework2.jar,
and telephony-common.jar from /system/framework/ folder
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3. Open the files framework.jar, framework2.jar, and telephony-common.jar using 7ZIP File Manager to copy classes.dex file.

4. Using dex2jar tool, convert classed.dex files to classes.jar.

5. This produces classes-dex2jar.jar file, Rename theses files to framework-classes.jar,
framework2-classes.jar, and telephony-classes.jar.
6. Now open the SDK location that is combined with Android Studio Environment.
7. Go to SDK/platform/ and copy the target platform folder android-X to android-Xmodified. In this research the generated folder was android-18-modified.
8. Open android.jar in android-X-modified.
9. Open framework-classes.jar, framework2-classes.jar, and telephony-classes.jar.
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10. Copy the contents of framework-classes.jar, framework2-classes.jar, and
telephony-classes.jar to android.jar, replacing all existing files.
11. Open build.porp file in android-18-modified folder, then change the number of the
API level to distinguish between original and modified in the following line:
ro.build.version.sdk = 18 to ro.build.version.sdk = 28.

12. Open source.properties file in android-18-modified folder, and then change the line:
AndroidVersion.ApiLevel= 18 to AndroidVersion.ApiLevel = 28.

13. Now open Android Studio Environment.
14. Create new project and choose the modified SDK.
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A.3. Obtaining and issuing the certificate
To generate the certificate used with some custom ROMs like CyanogenMod,
follow the instructions below:


Obtain the platform key and certificate, platform.pk8, and platform.x509.pem from
AndroidXref in the following URL:
http://androidxref.com/4.3_r2.1/xref/build/target/product/security/
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After that, obtain Openssl and SignApk.jar, which is a tool that creates the private
key from the certificate and public keys.



Copy the files SignApk, platform.pk8, and platform.x509.pem to Openssl directory.



Then create the keystore, open cmd.exe on Windows within Openssl directory and
issue the following commands:



Save the generated file platform.jks to use with Android Studio to generate the
certificate.



After compiling the Android project with Android Studio, sign the project with the
generated file above.
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And open Android Studio -> Build -> Generate Signed apk->enter the
password->chose the platform.jks file.

Now the signed Android app can be deployed as follows:


Plug in the smartphone.



Copy the signed apk to the smartphone device storage.



Open the adb path.



Remount the system partition read-write.



Install the application to the system apps folder.



Remount the system partition read-only.
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A.4. Modifying the Android Services.jar
To modify Android Services.jar, the next instructions were followed [45]:


Pull Services.jar file from the Android smartphones.



Open the .jar file with 7zip, extract the classes.dex, and copy it into a new folder.



Copy baksmali.jar and smali.jar to the created folder also.



Open the cmd terminal and change directory to the created folder.



Issue the following command to decompile the classes.dex file:



This command creates a new folder called classout where all of your smali files
will be found.



Go

into

the

classout

folder

and

look

for

the

following

file:

\com\android\server\pm\PackageManagerService.smali and replace the entire
following method:
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pareSignatures([Landroid/content/pm/Signature;[Landroid/content/pm/Signature;)I
.locals 7
if-nez p0, :cond_8
if-nez p1, :cond_6
const/4 v6, 0x1
:goto_5
return v6
:cond_6
const/4 v6, -0x1
goto :goto_5
:cond_8
if-nez p1, :cond_c
const/4 v6, -0x2
goto :goto_5
:cond_c
new-instance v3, Ljava/util/HashSet;
invoke-direct {v3}, Ljava/util/HashSet;-><init>()V
move-object v0, p0
array-length v2, v0
const/4 v1, 0x0
:goto_14
if-ge v1, v2, :cond_1e
aget-object v5, v0, v1
invoke-virtual {v3, v5}, Ljava/util/HashSet;->add(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
add-int/lit8 v1, v1, 0x1
goto :goto_14
:cond_1e
new-instance v4, Ljava/util/HashSet;
invoke-direct {v4}, Ljava/util/HashSet;-><init>()V
move-object v0, p1
array-length v2, v0
const/4 v1, 0x0
:goto_26
if-ge v1, v2, :cond_30
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aget-object v5, v0, v1
invoke-virtual {v4, v5}, Ljava/util/HashSet;->add(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
add-int/lit8 v1, v1, 0x1
goto :goto_26
:cond_30
invoke-virtual {v3, v4}, Ljava/util/HashSet;->equals(Ljava/lang/Object;)Z
move-result v6
if-eqz v6, :cond_38
const/4 v6, 0x0
goto :goto_5
:cond_38
const/4 v6, -0x3
goto :goto_5
.end method



Change and replace the entire .method above to this code:

.method
compareSignatures([Landroid/content/pm/Signature;[Landroid/content/pm/Signature;)I
.locals 7

static

const/4 v0, 0x0
return v0
.end method



Compile the classout folder into a new classes.dex by issuing the following
command:
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